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Abstract 
The links between unionization and job satisfaction remain controversial. In keeping with the existing 
literature we find statistically significant negative correlations between unionization and overall job 
satisfaction. However, failure to account for fixed unobservable differences between covered and 
uncovered employees leads to a systematic underestimate of the effects of coverage on both overall job 
satisfaction and satisfaction facets for both union members and non-members.  Once one accounts for 
these differences between covered and uncovered employees, union coverage is positively and 
significantly associated with satisfaction with pay and hours of work.  Examination of the pay satisfaction 
effect indicates this is apparent for employees who attain coverage in the same job and for those who 
become covered when switching employer, but the effect is not apparent for job switchers who remain 
with the same employer.  Furthermore, the ‘new’ coverage effect on pay satisfaction dissipates over time. 
JEL Classification: C35, J28, J51  
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1. Introduction 
There is a well-established negative correlation between union membership and job satisfaction.  The 
association is apparent in most data sets, across country and time.  This has puzzled analysts who 
anticipate union efforts to improve members’ wages and working environment should, if anything, lead to 
an improvement in employee job satisfaction.  However, there are several reasons why we might 
anticipate the negative correlation. First, since union membership is costly  it is likely that those who join 
are among those most dissatisfied with their jobs or, more generally, have dissatisfied personalities.  
Second, the poor conditions that generate dissatisfaction may trigger unionization.  If these sources of 
heterogeneity are unaccounted for in analyses this will downwardly bias the relationship between 
unionization and job satisfaction. Third, it is conceivable that the union effect is a true causal effect 
arising from unions’ voice function. This function, as described by Freeman and Medoff (1984) and 
others, leads unions to foment dissatisfaction with a view to strengthening the bargaining hand of the 
union in negotiations with the employer. 
Many efforts have been made to isolate the causal effect of unionization on job satisfaction.  One set of 
papers uses cross-sectional data and instrumental variables to account for the potential endogeneity of 
union status. Some of these papers find the negative association between union status and job satisfaction 
disappears when this is done.  A second set of papers identifies the impact of union status by tracking 
individuals over time, recovering the job satisfaction effect through switches in union status. These papers 
have the advantage that they account for fixed unobservable differences across unionized and non-
unionized workers.  Although results are mixed, these authors generally conclude that there is a negative 
association between union status and job satisfaction, one that appears robust to the inclusion of person 
fixed effects to account for otherwise unobserved heterogeneity across workers. However, two recent 
papers (Powdthavee, 2011; Artz, 2010), reviewed together with others in Section Two, have pointed to a 
positive association between becoming unionized and job satisfaction, at least over the short-run. 
It is therefore timely to reconsider this long-standing question.  Through a panel analysis (1991-2008) of 
both overall job satisfaction (OJS) and four facet satisfaction measures we demonstrate that the effects of 
union coverage on job satisfaction are more positive than hitherto believed.  Eliminating fixed 
unobservable differences we remove a downward bias in the union coverage coefficients that arises when 
fixed effects are ignored.  Moreover, union coverage actually has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on both pay satisfaction and hours satisfaction, two facets of satisfaction relating directly to unions’ 
negotiating role.  We find our results hold for covered union non-members as well as members, a finding 
that is consistent with non-members' ability to free-ride on non-excludable union goods.  Focusing 
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exclusively on pay satisfaction, we show that the positive impact of union coverage appears short-lived, a 
finding in line with Powdthavee (2011) and Artz (2010), but also in keeping with adjustments to 
employees' expectations, a process which is frequently noted in the wellbeing literature.   Our chief 
contribution is that we distinguish between union coverage effects on job satisfaction between those who 
switch union status within their current job, those who switch whilst with the same employer but across 
jobs, and those who move employer. This proves informative because the positive effect of coverage for 
pay satisfaction is apparent for employees who attain coverage in the same job and for those who become 
covered when switching employer, but the effect is not apparent for job switchers who remain with the 
same employer.  We discuss why this might be the case. 
Section Two reviews the existing literature and how this paper seeks to contribute to it. Section Three 
describes our conceptualization and estimation strategy for the analysis. Section Four presents the data 
and our empirical approach. Section Five presents the results. In Section Six we reflect on these findings 
and their implications for our understanding of the effects of union coverage. 
2. Individual Differences and Their Implications for Union Status and Job Satisfaction 
Reviews of the psychological literature show that much of the variation in subjective wellbeing results 
from individual differences in personality that are very persistent (Diener and Lucas, 1999: 226). Various 
applied studies have revealed biases in the estimates relating to effects of income, family and 
unemployment on subjective wellbeing (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Gerlach and Stephan, 
1996; Taylor et al., 2011).    
Similar considerations apply in relation to the link between job satisfaction and union status.  To our 
knowledge there is no empirical evidence regarding personality traits and individuals' propensity to be 
unionized. However, it seems reasonable to argue, as others have done (eg. Bender and Sloane, 1998) that 
workers are more likely to organize the more dissatisfied they are with their jobs and this may be part of a 
systemic tendency to dissatisfaction.  Those least satisfied with their job will perceive the greatest returns 
to unionization, leading them to organize or join an existing union while others may be less prepared to 
incur the costs.  The implication is that fixed unobservable differences across unionized and non-
unionized employees are liable to downwardly bias the effects of unionization on job satisfaction 
measures.   
The empirical literature remains split as to whether there is a negative effect of unionization on OJS and 
various facets of job satisfaction.  One strand of the literature which is based on cross-sectional data 
suggests the negative correlation between unionization and job satisfaction is accounted for by 
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unobservable features of the workplace or the employees who become members. For example, in one of 
the first studies for Britain, Bender and Sloane (1998) find the negative association between unionization 
and various job satisfaction measures (OJS, pay, promotion and job security) often disappears when 
accounting for the industrial relations climate, leading them to argue that union dissatisfaction may be 
genuine, arising from the poorer working environment which induces union organizing. In a similar vein 
studies for the United States (Gordon and Denisi, 1995) and Canada (Renaud, 2002) find union effects are 
non-significant having conditioned on working conditions. Two cross-sectional studies using linked 
employer-employee data by Bryson and co-authors focus on worker unobserved heterogeneity. Bryson et 
al. (2004) find negative associations between union membership and OJS and pay satisfaction become 
statistically non-significant when they instrument for union status, leading them to argue that the effect is 
driven by selection into union status.  In a follow up study using the same data they account for selection 
into both union membership and union coverage (Bryson et al., 2010).  In doing so they find a negative 
relationship between unionization and job satisfaction facets (respect from supervisors, influence over 
work and sense of achievement) which is confined to uncovered union members. They suggest 
membership may increase the 'taste' for coverage, leading to member dissatisfaction in an uncovered 
environment. 
A further set of studies is more directly linked to the current study because they use the same longitudinal 
panel data - the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) - to account for fixed unobservable differences 
across unionized and non-unionized workers. These studies offer seemingly conflicting accounts of the 
underlying link between unionization and job satisfaction.  In the first such study Heywood et al. (2002) 
analyzed pooled data for the private and public sectors from the first four waves of the BHPS covering the 
period 1991-1994.  They found links between union membership and job dissatisfaction persisted 
controlling for person fixed effects. Indeed, contrary to expectations outlined above, the negative union 
membership coefficient became much larger in the fixed effects models estimating overall job satisfaction 
and satisfaction with ‘relations with the boss’ compared with their OLS equivalents (op. cit.: 606). On the 
other hand, the negative union membership coefficient became smaller with the introduction of person 
fixed effects into the models estimating satisfaction with ‘the work itself’ and pay.  In the case of pay the 
union membership coefficient became statistically non-significant (op. cit.: 606).  Their paper illustrates 
the importance of distinguishing between different facets of job satisfaction. 
Using the BHPS data for 1995-2008 Green and Heywood (2014) find that, having accounted for both 
fixed individual and job effects, covered members are significantly less satisfied with ‘the work itself’ and 
job security. There are no differences by union status with respect to satisfaction with pay or hours.  
Furthermore, the introduction of worker fixed effects systematically reduces the size of the negative 
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coefficients for satisfaction with all aspects of the job (op. cit.: Table 5). The implication of this study, 
together with Heywood et al.'s (2002) earlier paper is that, once one accounts for individual fixed 
unobserved heterogeneity, there is no statistically significant association between union status and 
satisfaction with pay, and some evidence that the association disappears with respect to other job facets 
like hours.  Dissatisfaction with job security seems to persist.  One possible explanation for such findings 
is that unionized employees have concerns about the impact of successful union bargaining over terms 
and conditions, such as pay, on their job security. These concerns may be well-founded given the 
evidence linking union bargaining power with a higher incidence of within-workplace job cuts in Britain 
(White and Bryson, 2013). 
Recently analysts have been concerned with identifying the potential time-varying effect of switching 
union status on job satisfaction.  Powdthavee (2011) tackles the issue of time-variance in the relationship 
between union status and job satisfaction for private sector employees over the period 1995-2005 using 
waves 5-15 of the BHPS. He finds job satisfaction does indeed decline in the year prior to becoming 
unionized relative to the job satisfaction of those who continue to remain non-union (what he terms an 
‘anticipation’ effect).  He also shows that the initial positive impact of being newly unionized dies out 
quickly, a finding he argues is consistent with the voice-induced complaining needed to support union 
bargaining, an effect that counters the initial positive effect of becoming unionized. He refers to this 
process as ‘adaptation’.  There is one exception to this finding: the positive effect of becoming unionized 
on pay satisfaction persists, providing further evidence that, at least in this regard, union bargaining may 
have a causal impact on a key bargaining objective. 
In a similar study for the United States using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) Artz 
(2010) finds an initial positive impact of unionization on ‘global’ job satisfaction1 for those with no 
previous union experience.  However, as in Powdthavee's study, this positive effect decreases with 
workers' accumulated experience in the union.  
In the spirit of Powdthavee (2011) and Artz (2010) who explore links between satisfaction and the 
dynamics of unionization, we examine changes in job satisfaction with the time employees spend in a 
union covered environment. However, Powdthavee (2011) confines his analysis to those who do not 
switch workplace arguing that he wishes to avoid confounding job changers and the newly organised.2  
Instead, we retain all employees and explicitly distinguish between coverage changes associated with 
                                                          
1 This is the only job satisfaction measure available in NLSY for all years. 
2 Furthermore, his model specification means he focuses on the subset of respondents with at least 4 years of data 
before unionization and 3 years afterwards. 
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changing employer, changing jobs with the same employer, and coverage changes within the same job.  
As well as avoiding the sample selection issues inherent in Powdthavee's (2011) estimation we are able to 
tackle an issue not hitherto considered in the literature, namely whether satisfaction changes associated 
with changes in coverage are confined to particular types of employment situation.  
3.  Conceptualization and estimation 
In the light of the psychological literature referred to above, we assume that part of the negative 
association previously found between unionization and job satisfaction is attributable to unobserved 
personality variables.3  If these unobserved variables are constant over time, we can eliminate them by 
fixed effect methods.  Conditional on fixed individual differences, and assuming individuals to be rational 
in evaluating their employment situation, a positive effect of unionization will dominate where union 
bargaining has improved workers' terms and conditions relative to what they might have achieved in a 
non-union environment.  A negative effect will dominate where bargaining relies on voice-induced 
complaining to strengthen the bargaining hand of the union.  Negative effects will also arise where unions 
prove ineffectual in bargaining.  Equally unions may have no discernible impact on employees' job 
satisfaction where union gains are so slight that they simply compensate employees for poorer conditions 
than those they might face in a non-union setting. 
Our estimation strategy is two-pronged.  We chiefly rely on fixed-effects (FE) panel regression to 
estimate the union effect while removing unobservable fixed characteristics such as personality.  We also 
however obtain pooled OLS regression estimates that assume any unobserved fixed differences between 
individuals are ignorable.  Comparison of the two sets of estimates permits an assessment of the 
importance of unobservable fixed characteristics (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). 
The identification of union effects on job satisfaction in the fixed effects models relies on employees who 
switch union status. We distinguish between those who switch union status in their current job, those who 
switch jobs whilst at the same employer, and those who move employer.  These different settings can 
assist in interpreting union effects because they are informative about workers' union preferences and the 
information they have about unions and thus their expectations over time.  Let us take worker preferences 
first.  Employees who enter union coverage while working in the same job do so for one of two reasons: 
either a union gains recognition from the employer or an already recognised union widens its coverage to 
the employee's kind of job. Either way the switch is exogenous with respect to the employee since it is not 
                                                          
3  Ideally we would include personality variables in our specifications. We are unable to do so because the BHPS dataset 
offers such variables only in one year, and we find that their reliability is somewhat low (Cronbach alpha always below 
0.7 and in some cases below 0.6). 
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her choice.  On the other hand, when new coverage accompanies a switch in employer this may reflect 
choice on the part of the individual worker (who may be influenced, at least in part, by the coverage status 
of the new job) and the prospective employer (who may choose applicants deemed to be a good match for 
the covered setting).4 The intermediate case is where the employee changes coverage status having 
changed job while remaining with the same employer. Promotions to managerial status can entail a loss of 
coverage because managers are less likely to have pay set via collective bargaining, even in workplaces 
with coverage among non-managerial employees.  However, we know very little about the circumstances 
surrounding within-employer job changes so cannot infer how much choice individuals exert in practice.  
In many cases employees may be required to change job at the employer's behest. 
Turning to the issue of worker information about unions and thus their expectations regarding changes in 
terms and conditions pursuant to a change in coverage, it is well-established that unionization is an 
experiential good and, as such, workers only come to realise its costs and benefits over time (Bryson and 
Gomez, 2003).  Where a worker is newly covered by a union that has been operating at the workplace, for 
example, through an extension of the existing recognition agreement, the worker will form expectations 
based on some knowledge as to how it has performed for other workers at the same employer.  But if 
coverage arises through the arrival of a new union, or if a worker is switching to a new workplace, the 
employee is likely to base her expectations on what she knows about the average effect of unions.  Of 
course, in all cases, workers will update their expectations as they gather further information about the 
operation of the union once covered. 
Estimation 
Our estimation methods for both FE and OLS regression are standard but it may nevertheless be of some 
help to provide formal definitions as a basis for defining subsequent variant analyses.  The underlying 
model  is  
 Yit=Xit β + ci + uit   (1) 
where i indexes sample members and t the panel waves (years) at which they are observed, Y is a vector 
of values taken by a satisfaction measure, X is a vector of explanatory and control variables including an 
intercept, β is the vector of parameters to be estimated, ci are the individually specific constant effects and 
uit are the disturbances.  The constant terms ci can be arbitrarily correlated with the Xs.   
                                                          
4This firm entry route to coverage is what underpins Abowd and Farber's (1983) union selection model. 
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To estimate the model by panel regression we transform the observations by subtracting the individual-
specific means, resulting in the elimination of the ci.  The resulting fixed effect (FE) or ‘within regression’ 
estimates have the form ÿit = ẍit β  + üit  using the notation of Wooldridge (2002) where the  accents 
above model terms indicate de-meaned variables. In the pooled OLS regression models the fixed constant 
effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the X variables and are left in the disturbance term.    
Assuming this framework the models to be estimated are more fully specified as follows: 
y it = Xitβ  + [Ritγ]  + Ttδ  + litκ + ci + uit           (2) 
In equation (2) vector X denotes the control variables and consists of sub-vectors P (personal and family 
characteristics), W (workplace characteristics), and J (job characteristics) – the J variables are omitted in 
some analyses; vector [R] contains the explanatory variables concerning union representation and related 
variables, the brackets indicating that these vary across analyses - they will be more fully specified at the 
relevant points; T contains the time (wave or year) dummies, and l is a dummy indicating the last wave 
prior to the individual exiting the panel; c are the individual-specific unobserved constant characteristics, 
and u are the disturbances; finally, Greek letters indicate parameters to be estimated.   
The job satisfaction items (see Section 4) have 7-point response scales. Following others (Borjas 1979; 
van Praag, 1991; Frey and Stutzer (2002); Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Clark 2005; Green and 
Tsitsianis 2005; Green 2006: 168-9; Clark et al., 2008; Powdthavee, 2011; and Taylor et al., 2011) we 
make a cardinality assumption that is needed to run the FE and OLS regressions.5 Standard errors are 
computed by means of a robust variance estimator that takes account of panel clustering and also of 
heteroskedasticity. 
We analyze the unbalanced panel (basing the approach on Taylor et al. 2011).  The unbalanced nature of 
the panel involves potential selectivity effects.  As suggested by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and 
Wooldridge (2002) it is possible to get some indication of its likely influence on estimates by including 
among the regressors a dummy representing out-movement: including this dummy in our specification 
(see equation (2)), we found that its effect was not significant in any of the models of satisfaction. A 
further problem arising from the unbalanced nature of the panel is that it is not possible to weight the 
                                                          
5  Cardinality has been adopted by applied psychologists in a great many studies (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 
2004). Economists have often been unwilling to make such a strong assumption and have assumed only ordinality.  
Green and Heywood (2014) transform the satisfaction scales by the probit adapted OLS (POLS) method advocated by 
van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008: 29-34); see also Luechinger (2009) for a different application and interpretation 
of that method.  Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) note that POLS also requires strong assumptions.  Frey and 
Stutzer (2002) remark ‘Ordinal and cardinal treatments of satisfaction scores generate quantitatively very similar results 
in happiness functions’, see also conclusions in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004). In any event results presented in 
Section 5 are robust to POLS and are available on request. 
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data; panel estimates can only be computed with constant weights.  However, as detailed later, as an 
alternative to weighting, the analysis included a range of control variables that were used by the 
originators in stratifying the sample and in constructing the weights for the balanced panel (Taylor et al. 
2011). 
4. Data set, dependent variables, and controls  
4.1 Data set 
We analyze 17 waves of the BHPS through to 2008.6  The initial sample for BHPS was drawn in 1990 
and consisted of 9,912 full interviews with individuals from 5,538 households drawn as a stratified 
sample from all British households.7 Members are interviewed annually. Representativeness has been 
maintained by following individuals who set up or join new households and by admitting as new panel 
members those who form a family relationship to existing members. At various stages booster samples 
were added to the original sample design, e.g. to contribute to the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP), or to provide sufficient numbers for separate analysis of country sub-samples for Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland.  As these booster samples change the nature of the original sample, and as 
this cannot be corrected by weighting in the type of analysis we perform, we have excluded them entirely 
from all aspects of the analysis.8 
We analyze the unbalanced panel incorporating those who either leave or join during the observation 
period.  However, we exclude observations on leavers if they subsequently re-join the panel; leaving is 
treated as an ‘absorbing state’ (as recommended by Wooldridge 2002).9  We also exclude the 3,940 
observations who were only present for one period as they cannot contribute to the FE estimates.  Further 
we limit the analysis to observations when individuals are aged 20-60, in order to reduce problems of 
selection and self-selection into employee status: ages 16-19 being peak student years, and ages 61-65 
being peak years for (early) retirement and disability/incapacity claims. Around 52% of the original 
                                                          
6 Although we would have liked to extend the analysis to additional years the switch from the BHPS to Understanding 
Society introduced a number of data discontinuities that make this problematic.  
7 Userguide, 5151userguide_vola.pdf, Tables 16 & 17 (page A4-28). 
8 This entails the removal of 75,959 person-year observations, equivalent to 31.8% of the person-year observations. In 
principle oversampling can be corrected by inverse probability re-weighting.  However, the weights must be constant 
within the panel, something that is not possible since the supplementary samples are only present in certain waves.  If, 
on the other hand, one simply includes supplementary samples without weighting, two main kinds of bias are 
introduced:  first, the years when the supplements are present have an increased influence on model estimates; second, 
the results are no longer representative of British employees, or, in the case of the ECHP supplements, they are no 
longer representative of the British employee income distribution. 
9 14780 observations (9.1% of the original sample) are removed because they follow a gap resulting from non-interview 
at one or more waves.  We ignore observations after these sample members return because to include them would lead 
to irregular spacing of the interviews with various adverse consequences – e.g. no consistent definition of leads and lags. 
10 
 
sample observations are employees.  Of these 70,870 observations 5,655 are dropped because the 
respondents are outside the 20-60 age range. After exclusions for missing data10 we are left with 
somewhat more than 58,000 person-year observations on a little more than 8,000 individuals. 
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variables 
The literature review indicates the importance of considering a range of job satisfaction measures and 
considering how each relates to the role of unions. We consider the five job satisfaction measures that are 
available across all waves of the BHPS (see next paragraph).  We attach special importance to satisfaction 
with pay, but we also need to consider other aspects since pay bargains may have further repercussions.  
In the traditional right-to-manage model the bargaining object is wages whereas employment is set 
unilaterally by the employer conditional on those wages.  Although there is evidence that unions negotiate 
over employment as well as wages in many instances (van Wanrooy et al., 2013) the right-to-manage 
model is usually viewed as a reasonable approximation to the British case.  The implication is that the 
union wage premium should raise satisfaction with pay if the employee's reference point is her outside 
market wage.  However, the wage premium may come at the cost of increased concerns regarding job 
security since wage pressures may encourage employers to substitute capital for labour and, in extremis, 
threaten workplace survival.  
Five outcome variables are separately analyzed.  Overall job satisfaction (OJS) is often interpreted by 
economists as a single-item measure of the subjective utility of a job.  It is the most widely used measure 
in occupational psychology and has well established associations with behavioural outcomes including 
performance ratings, absence, lateness and quit rates (Judge et al. 2001; Harrison et al. 2006). However 
there may be many influences on overall job satisfaction that have not been enumerated (see Warr et al. 
1979) and many would lie outside the domain of unions.   Four further measures obtain ratings of 
satisfaction with facets of jobs: job security, the work itself, hours, and pay. Each of these relates to an 
area in which British trade unions have been engaged and also that are currently discussed as aspects of 
employment conditions under pressures from globalized competition and technological change (Green 
2006; Gallie 2007).  Table 1 provides further descriptive details. 
                                                          
10 7,536 observations (4.6% of the original sample) are removed due to missing data arising from proxy or telephone 
interviewing. Union coverage status is missing in waves 2-4 for individuals who have not changed jobs (see next section); 
apart from this, small numbers of observations have missing data on union status or job satisfaction. 
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[INSERT TABLE 1] 
4.2.2 Explanatory variables 
We take union coverage, rather than union membership, as our point of departure, on the assumption that 
any causal impact on employees’ job satisfaction will arise through results of the bargaining process.  
Collectively bargained terms and conditions of employment are normally extended to non-members in a 
covered environment, and so we might not anticipate differential effects of union coverage on the job 
satisfaction of members and non-members; indeed non-members may derive added satisfaction from 
receiving the benefits of coverage without paying union dues. We consider whether there are differences 
in the coverage effects on members’ and non-members’ job satisfactions.11 
Accordingly, there are two chief explanatory variables that are used alternately in parallel analyses: union 
recognition and union membership.  Employee respondents are first asked ‘Is there a trade union or a 
similar body such as a staff association, recognized by your management for negotiating pay or conditions 
for the people doing your sort of job in your workplace?’  This question not only focuses on workplace 
trade union recognition, but also on recognition that covers the respondent’s job or occupation at that 
workplace.  From this question we get the union recognition dummy (designated R-r).  At waves 2-4, the 
question was only asked of employees who had changed their job (including through promotion in the 
same workplace), so that union recognition is missing for employees who had not changed job.  We 
assessed robustness of our results to the exclusion of these years.   
If the respondent stated that a union was recognized, she was then asked ‘Are you a member of that trade 
union or association?’  We construct a union membership variable (designated R-m) with three 
categories: trade union member with recognized union/association; non-member where there is a 
recognized trade union/association (sometimes referred to as ‘free-rider’); no trade union recognised .  
Table 2 shows the frequency distributions of the union recognition and membership variables. 
We therefore have two basic specifications for estimation: 
y it = Xitβ  + R-ritγ1  + Ttδ  + litκ + uit           (2a) 
                                                          
11 The situation in Britain is quite different from that in the United States where, even in right-to-work states, non-
members are often required to pay union dues if covered by collective bargaining, even if they choose to remain union 
non-members.  Partly because of this there are relatively few union non-members in covered workplaces in the United 
States (Bryson and Freeman, 2013). 
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y it = Xitβ  + R-mitγ2  + Ttδ  + litκ + uit           (2b) 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
4.2.3 Control variables 
The control variables as shown in Appendix Table 1 are either individual/household characteristics (P) 
commonly used in models of labour market participation and earnings, or else are workplace 
characteristics (W) or job conditions (J) that are likely to affect employee attitudes. The inclusion of these 
J variables entails some risk of endogeneity bias as they may partly reflect individual choices, but if 
omitted the union effects may be distorted.12   We therefore re-ran all analyses excluding the controls for 
job conditions.  However, results were very similar so we only report those results where they differed 
significantly from main results.  We also incorporate variables that were used in the original construction 
of the strata and weights for the survey sample – these are household variables and therefore form part of 
set P. Finally, in the pay satisfaction models that conclude our analyses we add an interactive variable for 
movement to a different employment in the current spell and a control for the cumulative number of years 
observed in employee status; this additional specification will be defined more fully later. 
4.2.4 Sub-sample analyses 
We ran all analyses for the whole economy and for the market sector since the nature of unionization and 
the institutional settings in the market and non-market sectors in Britain are fundamentally different. In 
practice, differences were small so we focus on the whole economy analysis here only reporting on 
sectoral differences when significant.  Sector of employment (market versus non-market) was included as 
a control variable in the whole economy analyses. We also ran models for female employees only.  These 
yielded results that were similar to those for the reported analyses that are pooled across gender. 
4.2.5 Union change and employment moves 
Perhaps the biggest limitation of previous studies has been an inability to account for the potential 
endogeneity of switches in union coverage status.  Employees can move from the uncovered to the 
covered sector in one of three ways (movement in the opposite direction is also definable in terms of the 
same three employment stability or change conditions).  
                                                          
12 Working conditions might be endogenous to the extent that they are choice variables. However, this is less likely to be 
the case if employers fix them by virtue of asymmetric power. 
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(1) Their existing job is newly organised by a union with bargaining rights.   
(2)  They switch jobs in the same workplace and the new job is covered while the previous one was not.  
(3) The employee may switch to a workplace where she has union coverage, from a previous employment 
in a non-covered situation.   
Since the three circumstances associated with switching coverage have potentially different implications 
for job satisfaction it is informative to explore interactions between union switching and employment 
switching. We therefore constructed an additional variable to represent employment stability or change 
(designated E) using the three categories noted above: same employer and same job in current wave as in 
previous wave; same employer but different job from previous wave; different employer (i.e., a new 
employment) from previous wave. In the BHPS data, we are able to classify 97.5 per cent of cases where 
we have union status information into these three employment stability/change categories.   
For the joint analysis of unionization and employment stability/change we have two specifications to 
estimate. In the first, the [R-ritγ] term in (2a) is replaced by a combined treatment of union coverage in 
current period, union coverage in previous period, and employment stability/change status in the current 
period.  We include the main effects and the two-way interactions while omitting the higher-order 
interaction:13  putting E(2) for change of job within same employer, and E(3) for change to a different 
employer, this part of the model can be written as follows: 
R-ritγ1 +  R-ri(t-1)γ2 + E(2)it γ3 + E(3)it γ4 + (R-rit. R-ri(t-1)) γ5  + (R-rit. E(2)it)γ6 +  + (R-rit. E(3)it)γ7  ...  
... +  (R-ri(t-1). E(2)it) γ8  +  (R-ri(t-1). E(3)it) γ9. 
In the second specification, relationships are considered between union membership status in the current 
period, union coverage in the previous period, and employment stability/change status in the current 
period.  As before we include the main effects and the two-way interactions but omit the higher-order 
terms. Putting R-m(1) for covered member and R-m(2) for covered nonmember, this part of  model (2b) 
can be re-written as follows: 
R-m(1)itγ1 + R-m(2)itγ2 +  R-ri(t-1)γ3 +  E(2)it γ4 + E(3)it γ5 + (R-m(1)it. R-ri(t-1)) γ6  + ... 
                                                          
13  We also estimated models with the complete 3-way interaction including the high-order terms but a likelihood ratio 
test indicated that this did not improve model fit (chi-square 2.23 on 2 d.f., p=0.34). 
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... (R-m(2)it. R-ri(t-1)) γ7 +  (R-m(1)it.E(2)it)γ8 +  (R-m(2)it.E(2)it)γ9 + (R-m(1)it.E(3)it)γ10 ... 
...  +  (R-m(2)it.E(3)it)γ11 + (E(2)it .R-ri(t-1))γ12 + (E(3)it .R-ri(t-1))γ13. 
We focus the joint analysis of union coverage and employment change on satisfaction with pay. Pay 
bargaining is central to the role of unions.14  Our chief assumption in framing this analysis is that pay 
satisfaction is formed by a rational evaluation that takes account of both current pay and future predicted 
pay from a given employment/job. Employees entering a unionized situation can on average expect a 
union premium or mark-up (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) and the prediction is therefore that pay 
satisfaction will be increased.  This will not necessarily continue subsequently unless union bargaining is 
able to make further gains relative to the initial mark-up.  Employees’ pay satisfaction may also be 
affected by limitations on information and changes in information availability over time, as noted earlier.  
We acknowledge that job moves - and decisions to stay put - are determined, at least in part, by individual 
choices. However, the main determinants of personal choice (qualifications and skills, family situation, 
and unobserved persistent attributes such as personality and ability) are already controlled or eliminated 
in our specification while the time-varying factors that influence mobility, notably labour market 
conditions or particular vacancies, are exogenously determined.  For reasons noted earlier, switches into 
union coverage are most likely exogenous among employees remaining in the same job with the same 
employer and are most likely endogenous among those switching employer, with those switching job at 
the same employer being an intermediate case.  In all three instances we anticipate a switch into union 
coverage will raise satisfaction with pay and, possibly, other terms and conditions that are subject to 
union bargaining.  These gains may nevertheless come at the expense of satisfaction with job security, 
unless unions bargain over wages and employment, whereupon bargaining may lead to efficient 
outcomes.  Whether any positive effects persist depends, in part, on union effectiveness and employee 
expectations regarding those effects. 
5. Results  
5.1 Overall effects of union coverage 
The effects of union coverage on job satisfaction in the whole economy are presented in Table 3. 
Coefficients from OLS estimates are presented in the left-hand columns and those from person FE models 
                                                          
14  Parallel analyses of satisfaction with hours and job security are not included here for reasons of space; 
additionally, analysis of the latter outcome (job security) proved less robust to specification change (see also note 
17). 
15 
 
are presented in the right-hand columns.  All estimates can be interpreted in terms of the proportions of 
the unit response on a response scale of 1-7 with 7 being high (more satisfied).   
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
The OLS estimates show a negative statistically significant association between union coverage and three 
of the five job satisfaction measures, namely OJS, job security and satisfaction with the work itself.  
There is no statistically significant association between union coverage and satisfaction with pay or hours.   
While Table 3 shows only the estimates for the representation variables, FE estimates for the full 
specification, with pay satisfaction as the dependent variable, are shown in Appendix Table 1.  The 
linearity of the model permits the effect size of union representation to be assessed by direct comparison 
with effects of other variables.  For instance, the union effect is almost the same as the effect of an 
employee receiving incentive payments, and is one third as great as the effect on pay satisfaction of 
possession of a degree qualification. 
Conditioning on person fixed effects, so that we are comparing the effects of union coverage within 
individuals over time, the effects of union coverage become more positive.  This is apparent from a direct 
comparison of the OLS and FE coefficients.15 Under the FE model union coverage is associated with 
significantly higher satisfaction with pay and hours, which are often the subject of direct bargaining 
between unions and employers (van Wanrooy et al., 2013).  However, coverage continues to be 
associated with significantly lower job security.16 17 
The consistently more positive estimates under the FE models indicate that there is substantial negative 
bias from unobserved fixed effects in the OLS regression model.  For a possible interpretation of these 
effects, see the literature reviewed in Section 2.  
                                                          
15 The significance of the differences between the OLS and fixed effects estimates cannot be established but the sign of 
the (FE-OLS) difference is positive without exception. 
16 We obtain very similar results if we confine the analysis to the market sector. The only notable difference is that the 
negative association between coverage and satisfaction with job security is larger in the market sector and robust to the 
exclusion of job characteristics. However, the estimates relating to the effect of current coverage on job security were 
not robust when we introduced the more complex specification detailed in section 5.3 below;  current union coverage 
then had a non-significant marginal effect, while it was lagged coverage that had a significantly negative effect.  These 
results, and others reported in the text only, are available from the authors on request. 
17 We reran the analyses on waves 5 to 17 of BHPS, thus avoiding potential problems regarding measurement error in 
union status in early waves.  But the results are similar.  For instance, in the fixed effects model with job controls the 
union coverage effect on pay satisfaction is 0.088, t=2.97, for hours satisfaction it is 0.068, t=2.57.  Dropping the job 
characteristics from the specification the pay satisfaction coefficient is .093 (t=3.14) while the coefficient in the hours 
satisfaction equation is .072 (t=2.71).    The coverage effects on overall satisfaction estimates are positive and non-
significant while those for job security and work satisfaction are negative and non-significant. 
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5.2 Differences between covered members and non-members 
To establish whether coverage effects differ across covered members and non-members we run models 
with the same controls but this time distinguish employees according to whether they are members of the 
union recognised for pay bargaining.  The reference category is all uncovered employees. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
Focusing on the FE estimates in Table 4, one sees that members have significantly positive satisfaction on 
pay (one per cent level) and hours (10 per cent level), but are significantly negative on security (one per 
cent level), work and OJS (5 per cent level).  The covered nonmembers always have more positive 
estimates than the members.  Like members they are positive on pay and hours (one per cent level), but 
they are also positive on OJS (five per cent level) and have non-significant estimates for security and 
work itself.  Compared to members, the more positive estimates for the nonmembers are significant for 
security, work, and OJS but non-significant for pay and hours satisfaction.   
Turning to the OLS v FE comparisons in Table 4, the FE estimates are always more positive, both for 
members and nonmembers, just as for the estimates relating to overall union coverage. This underlines 
the pervasive negative bias on satisfaction ratings that arise in models that do not account for unobserved 
fixed effects. 
5.3 Effects on pay satisfaction of union change together with employment change  
In Section Three we outlined a rationale for an elaborated model specification incorporating lagged 
information to examine entry into union coverage along with employment stability or change. We apply 
the same controls as before (but omitting the job characteristics variables).  Note that when introducing 
lagged terms into the analysis individuals who were not employees at the previous wave (as well as the 
current wave) will be omitted.  The analysis sample is therefore slanted towards people in continuous 
employee status.  We estimate a model that contains the three separate two-way interactions: union 
coverage now x lagged union coverage; union coverage now x employment change; lagged union 
coverage x employment change (see Section Four for the formal definition).  
In Table 5, we present results in terms of mean marginal predictions (henceforth ‘marginal means’) for 
each combination of the interacted variables. These are the average of the outcome variable as predicted 
by the model estimates when all observations are fixed at that combination while all the other variables in 
the model are left with their observed values.  Pairwise comparisons between marginal means are 
equivalent to conditional partial effects, and these are shown in the right-side columns of Table 5.   
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Panel (a) of the table shows that those who switch from being uncovered last year to covered in the 
current year experience an  increase in pay satisfaction (compared with those not covered at both years) of 
0.190, a difference significant at the 1 per cent level. Those who are covered in both years experience a 
small increase in satisfaction relative to those who lose coverage (4.983 against 4.917), but this contrast is 
non-significant at the 10 per cent level. Tests can also be constructed for other pairwise contrasts than 
those shown in the table. For instance, the pay satisfaction of those who lose coverage remains higher 
than for those not covered at both years, the difference in this case being significant at the 10 per cent 
level.  The persistently uncovered have the lowest satisfaction level (coefficient 4.841).  
Panel (b) of Table 5 shows the effects of changes in coverage for different sorts of union switchers.   Pay 
satisfaction rises with union coverage (relative to not being covered) both when individuals remain in the 
same employment and job, and when they move to a different employment, consistent with the hypothesis 
of an immediate union mark-up.  However there is a smaller and non-significant increase in satisfaction 
due to coverage when individuals move to a different job within the same employer.   
[Table 5 about here] 
To interpret the practical significance of these results, note that movements into union coverage while 
remaining in the same job comprised 53 per cent of all new coverage, while movements to a new 
(covered) employment comprised 39 per cent and internal job moves providing new coverage comprised 
8 per cent.  A transition matrix for union coverage in the previous and current year, conditional on 
employment stability or change, is provided at Appendix Table 2. 
In panel (c) of Table 5 we have the mean margins and pairwise comparisons of union coverage in the 
previous year for job stayers and movers by current year.   The results show that lagged coverage has no 
significantly positive effects on pay satisfaction when interacted with employment stability/change. 
Indeed, when combined with movement to a new employment, the effect of lagged (1-year) union 
coverage is significantly negative at the 10 per cent level.  This is evidence that the effects of union 
coverage in the period analysed were not persistent. 
We have hypothesized a positive effect of union coverage on pay satisfaction on the grounds that unions 
are expected to achieve a wage mark-up, and that covered employees’ satisfaction with pay reflects a 
rational evaluation based on this.  The same panel regression models used to estimate union effects on pay 
satisfaction were rerun with the natural logarithm of the usual hourly wage as the dependent variable.  
The average mark-up over the 1991-2007 period, for covered versus non-covered (in a specification 
analogous to that of Table 3 – FE estimates), is 7.5% with p<0.001.  In a model with interaction terms 
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corresponding to those in Table 5, the partial effect of current coverage is estimated to be 5.2 % while that 
of coverage in the previous year is found to be 2.1%; both estimates have p<0.01.  These are whole-
economy estimates and the corresponding estimates for the market sector subsample are somewhat 
smaller, 4.3% and 1.3% respectively – the former significant at the one per cent level, the latter  non-
significant.18   
5.4 Effects on pay satisfaction of union membership together with employment change  
Given the recent literature distinguishing between coverage effects on members and non-members we ran 
estimates of current coverage status on members' and non-members' pay satisfaction distinguishing 
between the routes by which they gained coverage.  (See Section Four for formal definition of this 
model.) The results, presented in Table 6, indicate that the effects of switching into coverage are similar 
for both union members and non-members.  In both cases becoming covered is positively and 
significantly associated with pay satisfaction, whether one entered coverage whilst in the same job, or by 
switching employers. However, neither members nor non-members benefited significantly from coverage 
if coverage was acquired by entering a different job in the same employment. 
 [Table 6 about here] 
6. Conclusions 
In keeping with the existing literature we find strong statistically significant negative correlations between 
unionization and job satisfaction when individual fixed effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with 
regressors. However, in contrast to much of the previous literature, having accounted for fixed 
unobservable differences between covered and uncovered employees, union coverage is positively and 
significantly associated with satisfaction with pay and hours of work.  These effects are apparent for 
covered members and non-members. Furthermore, shifting from OLS to fixed effects estimates results in 
the union coverage coefficients becoming more positive for job satisfaction across a range of job 
satisfaction measures, something that happens for both union members and non-members.  It seems 
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that union coverage has a positive impact on some aspects of job 
satisfaction.   
These results are consistent with union bargaining effects which result in higher pay, and hours schedules 
that better suit covered employees' preferences, relative to what they might have received in the 
uncovered sector.  In keeping with the literature on the non-excludable nature of collectively bargained 
                                                          
18 Full details are available from the authors on request. 
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terms and conditions, the positive benefits of coverage are not confined to union members. On the 
contrary, satisfaction is higher among non-members than it is among members, even having accounted for 
fixed unobservable differences across individuals.  This may reflect the fact that the net returns to 
coverage are highest for non-members who are able to avoid the financial costs of membership and 
reduce the potentially adverse effects of voice-induced complaining that members engage in to strengthen 
the union's bargaining hand in negotiation. 
Our results are, perhaps, most similar to those of Powdthavee (2011).  He also uses the BHPS and, like 
us, he shows that union coverage effects on job satisfaction differ markedly across facets of the job in a 
way that is consistent with union bargaining effects. In general, he observes an increase in job satisfaction 
once covered by a union which diminishes with time, as we do.  However, his use of lagged job 
satisfaction measures means his analysis is confined to employees appearing in many years in the BHPS, 
so his sample is more selective than ours. Furthermore, he excludes those switching workplace such that 
his analysis only captures changes in coverage within a particular workplace.  Our analysis, on the other 
hand, includes coverage changes due both to changes within and across workplaces.  Furthermore, for pay 
satisfaction we extend the literature by interacting changes in coverage status with changes in 
employment status.  Specifically we distinguish between coverage changes associated with changes in 
employer, changes in job with the same employer, and coverage changes that occur whilst remaining in 
the same job.  We find the effect is not significant for those who switch jobs in the same employment.  
This may be because union-covered jobs are less likely to be at managerial/upper-grade level, and/or 
because differentials within the union-covered segment of a workforce are relatively small (because of 
comparison bargaining).  These suggestions are speculative and point to the need for further research in 
this area.  The biggest coverage effects on employees' pay satisfaction arise when coverage is extended to 
an employee remaining with the same employer in the same job - which is when we most expect the 
switch to be exogenous - and when union coverage is gained via a switch in employer. 
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Table 1: Descriptives for job satisfaction dependent variables – by union coverage status 
satisfaction with: pay security work hours overall 
 mean  s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
covered member 4.84 1.54 
16864 
5.23 1.59 5.34 1.36 5.08 1.48 5.25 1.33 
covered non-
member 
nnnnnnnonmember 
4.89 1.50 5.27 1.54 5.44 1.33 5.33 1.35 5.38 1.26 
total covered 4.85 1.53 5.25 1.57 5.38 1.35 5.17 1.44 5.30 1.30 
not covered 4.85 1.59 5.44 1.49 5.50 1.32 5.16 1.47 5.39 1.31 
all employees 4.82 1.58 5.31 1.56 5.46 1.34 5.18 1.46 5.18 1.46 
Notes:  Unweighted sample statistics for employee respondents aged 20-60. All satisfaction 
questions are answered on a response scale scored 1 to 7: ‘completely satisfied’, ‘very satisfied’, 
‘satisfied’, ‘neither satisfied not dissatisfied’, ‘dissatisfied’, ‘very dissatisfied’, ‘completely 
dissatisfied’.  The scoring has been reversed so that 1 represents ‘completely dissatisfied’ while 7 
represents ‘completely satisfied’.  Means for  ‘all employeees’ may be inconsistent with the 
covered/noncovered means because of missing data on the union variables. 
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Table 2: Union recognition and membership frequencies 
Union or staff association 
recognized at workplace? 
N observations column % 
yes  27838 40.4 
no 26945 39.1 
missing data 14094 20.5 
Total 68877 100 
If union recognized, is 
respondent a member? 
  
yes 17459 25.3 
no 10351 15.0 
membership  data missing       28   0.1 
no union recognized 26945 39.1 
union recognition missing 14094 20.5 
Total 68877 100 
Notes:  Unweighted sample statistics for employee respondents aged 20-60.  About two thirds of missing data for 
union recognition arises in waves 2-4 where respondents were only asked this question if they had changed jobs 
(including by promotion) since the previous wave. 
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Table 3: Union Coverage Effects on Job Satisfaction 
Outcome: OLS   FE   bfe-bols 
 b (s.e.) t Nit b (s.e.) t Ni  
Overall JS -.11 (.02) 4.82 49996 .01 (.02) 0.46 8077 0.122 
Pay -.02 (.03) 0.77 49958 .12 (.03) 4.16 8071 0.136 
Job security -.25 (.03) 9.64 49779 -.07 (.03) 2.66 8050 0.180 
Work itself -.15 (.02) 6.08 49979 -.02 (.02) 0.85 8074 0.062 
Hours .00 (.03) 0.16 49992 .09 (.03) 3.60 8074 0.087 
For details of control variables, which are included in all the above analyses, see Appendix Table 
1. 
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Table 4: Union Membership Effects on Job Satisfaction 
 
Outcome:  OLS   FE   bfe-bols 
  b (s.e.) t Nit b (s.e.) t Ni  
Overall JS mem -.17 (.03) 6.36 49970 -.07 (.03) 2.15 8074 0.105 
 nm -.03 (.03) 1.04 .06 (.03) 2.40 0.088 
Pay mem -.04 (.03) 1.49 49932 .09 (.04) 2.7 8068 0.138 
 nm .02 (.03) 0.50 .13 (.03) 4.41 0.116 
Job security mem -.29 (.03) 9.31 49753 -.14 (.04) 3.89 8047 0.155 
 nm -.19 (.03) 6.91 -.03 (.03) 1.06 0.164 
Work itself mem -.21 (.03) 7.29 49953 -.08 (.03) 2.51 8071 0.127 
 nm -.07 (.03) 2,41 .02 (.03) 0.67 0.082 
Hours mem -.07 (.03) 2.21 49966 .06 (.03) 1.83 8071 0.124 
 nm .10 (.03) 3.71 .11 (.03) 4.23 0.011 
Notes:mem=member in covered workplace employment; nm=nonmember in covered workplace employment; 
reference category is not covered.  For controls see Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 5: Mean marginal predictions of pay satisfaction – interaction effects of current or 
previous union coverage and employment change  
                      estimates (s.e.) pairwise 
comparisons 
(a) not covered now covered now contrast z 
not covered last year 4.841 (0.023) 5.031 (0.031) 0.190 4.64 
covered last year 4.917 (0.035) 4.983 (0.020) 0.066 1.54 
(b)     
staying in same employment 
and job 
4.824 (0.023) 4.942 (0.020) 0.117 3.49 
same employment, different 
job 
5.027 (0.047) 5.084 (0.042) 0.057 0.78 
different employment 5.064 (0.036) 5.278 (0.038) 0.214 3.88 
(c) not covered last 
year 
covered last 
year 
  
staying in same employment 
and job 
4.874 (0.022) 4.897 (0.021) 0.023 0.69 
same employment, different 
job 
5.022 (0.047) 5.088 (0.042) 0.066 0.90 
different employment 5.224 (0.034) 5.132 (0.036) -0.093 -1.87 
The above mean marginal predictions and standard errors are derived from the interaction terms  
(current union coverage status x lagged union coverage status) + (current union coverage status x 
employment change status) + (lagged union coverage status x employment change status).  The 
model specification includes controls for P and W characteristics, a dummy indicating last 
observation in the individual panel, and a constant term – see also Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 6: Covered members and covered nonmembers: partial effects on pay satisfaction 
under different employment change conditions 
covered union member and: estimate (s.e.) z 
- same employment same job 0.143 (0.046) 3.13 
-same employment different job 0.087 (0.085) 1.02 
- different employment 0.203 (0.070) 2.91 
covered union nonmember and:   
- same employment same job 0.100 (0.037) 2.97 
-same employment different job 0.052 (0.080) 0.65 
- different employment 0.232 (0.062) 3.72 
The above conditional partial effects and standard errors are derived from the interaction term 
(current union membership and coverage status x employment change status). The model 
specification also contains interaction terms for (current union membership and coverage status x 
lagged union coverage status) and (lagged union coverage status x employment change status), 
as well as controls for P and W characteristics, a dummy indicating last observation in the 
individual panel, and a constant term – see also Appendix Table 1. 
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Appendix Table 1:   Panel fixed effects regression of pay satisfaction – complete estimates 
 estimates test            descriptives 
Variable b, s.e t mean between 
s.d. 
within 
s.d. 
trade union coverage  0.1151, 0.0276 4.16 0.509 0.443 0.265 
Time dummies (T)      
year 2 0.2843, 0.0596 4.77 0.022 0.144 0.125 
year 3 0.3467, 0.0578 6.00 0.021 0.117 0.129 
year 4 0.2450, 0.0582 4.21 0.021 0.099 0.132 
year 5 0.1907, 0.0399 4.78 0.071 0.128 0.244 
year 6 0.2306, 0.0410 5.62 0.071 0.106 0.247 
year 7 0.2672, 0.0429 6.23 0.073 0.108 0.251 
year 8 0.5349, 0.0438 12.21 0.073 0.112 0.251 
year 9 0.4818, 0.0464 10.40 0.070 0.100 0.249 
year 10 0.48403, 0.0490 9.89 0.071 0.102 0.248 
year 11 0.5706, 0.0524 10.88 0.069 0.101 0.245 
year 12 0.5256, 0.0561 9.36 0.066 0.098 0.240 
year 13 0.54319, 0.0582 9.34 0.063 0.093 0.235 
year 14 0.5448, 0.0625 8.72 0.060 0.094 0.230 
year 15 0.5825, 0.0656 8.88 0.059 0.099 0.225 
year 16 0.56932, 0.0676 8.43 0.058 0.116 0.223 
year 17 0.5688, 0.0713 7.98 0.055 0.160 0.212 
Personal/household (P)      
age 30-39 0.0660, 0.0347 1.90 0.300 0.347 0.338 
age 40-49 -0.0109, 0.0512 -0.21 0.271 0.326 0.330 
age 50-59 -0.0002, 0.0696 -0.00 0.187 0.353 0.221 
female & youngest 0-2 0.1195, 0.0474 2.52 0.030 0.119 0.143 
female & youngest 3-4 0.1747, 0.0498 3.51 0.30 0.107 0.146 
female & youngest 5-11 0.0686, 0.0463 1.48 0.094 0.220 0.208 
female & youngest 12-16 0.0434, 0.0444 0.98 0.050 0.140 0.181 
female & youngest 17-18 0.0015, 0.0596 0.02 0.012 0.070 0.099 
male & youngest 0-2 0.02307, 0.0455 0.51 0.045 0.145 0.169 
male & youngest 3-4 0.0580, 0.0492 1.18 0.032 0.104 0.154 
male & youngest 5-11 0.0180, 0.0455 0.40 0.080 0.200 0.197 
male & youngest 12-15 0.0051, 0.0480 0.11 0.038 0.128 0.158 
male & youngest 16-18 0.0233, 0.0658 0.35 0.010 0.059 0.088 
professional qualification 0.0098, 0.0413 0.24 0.322 0.419 0.195 
highest qual. degree  0.3394, 0.1493 2.27 0.180 0.372 0.079 
highest qual. a-level/equiv. 0.2251, 0.1255 1.79 0.278 0.434 0.079 
highest qual. o-level/equiv 0.1784, 0.1151 1.55 0.289 0.442 0.091 
female, partner not 
employed 
0.1721, 0.0730 2.36 0.032 0.157 0.115 
female, partner employed 0.1581, 0.0468 3.38 0.361 0.445 0.185 
male, partner not employed -0.0328, 0.0594 -0.55 0.075 0.227 0.165 
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male, partner employed 0.0326, 0.0504 0.65 0.230 0.412 0.202 
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Appendix Table 1 continued 
 estimates test          descriptives 
P – related to sample 
design 
b, s.e. z mean between 
s.d. 
within 
s.d. 
use of car/van 0.0461, 0.0471 0.98 0.916 0.283 0.152 
last year labour income 0.000008,  
0.000003 
2.57 16183 10067.3 8772.0 
last year nonlabour income -0.000016  
0.000022 
-0.72 1130 2345.6 2378.9 
outright owner 0.01746, 0 .0520 0.34 0.127 0.298 0.192 
owner with mortgage -0.0065, 0.0422 -0.15 0.694 0.430 0.258 
rent public housing -0.0424,  0.0636 -0.67 0.094 0.303 0.136 
workplace (W)      
market sector -0.1121, 0.0442 -2.53 0.675 0.422 0.200 
size 25-49 -0.0286,  0.0290 -0.99 0.135 0.256 0.257 
size 50-99 -0.0143, 0.0331 -0.43 0.117 0.239 0.244 
size 100-199 0.0122, 0.0349 0.35 0.106 0.228 0.236 
size 200-499 0.0275, 0.0353 0.78 0.133 0.257 0.246 
size 500-999 0.0236, 0.0413 0.57 0.069 0.183 0.192 
size 1000 + -0.0072, 0.0422 -0.17 0.108 0.251 0.194 
utilities 0.1705, 0.1783 0.96 0.010 0.089 0.058 
manufacturing -0.1328, 0.1302 -1.02 0.202 0.361 0.200 
construction -0.0150,  0.1395 -0.11 0.036 0.185 0.176 
distribution -0.3056, 0.1299 -2.35 0.168 0.346 0.205 
transport & communications -0.1231, 0.1383 -0.89 0.063 0.214 0.129 
finance & business services -0.1561, 0.1314 -1.19 0.155 0.320 0.194 
government -0.2136, 0.1355 -1.58 0.087 0.230 0.138 
education -0.1936, 0.1422 -1.36 0.100 0.267 0.129 
health -0.3972,  0.1357 -2.93 0.099 0.253 0.155 
other services -0.2122, 0.1300 -1.63 0.078 0.226 0.174 
job (J)      
hours  -0.0059, 0.0013 -4.64 34.37 10.0 6.22 
incentive receipt 0.1142,  0.0187 6.10 0.321 0.356 0.335 
fixed-term contract 0.1378, 0.0752 1.83 0.025 0.129 0.125 
permanent contract 0.0457, 0.0565 0.81 0.952 0.194 0.168 
leaving sample indicator 0 .0148, 0.0336 0.44 0.047 0.220 0.174 
constant 4.3202,  0 .1824 23.69    
Ni = 8071  Proportion of variance due to fixed effects = 0.532  
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Appendix Table 2:  Transitions between jobs/employments and between union covered and 
noncovered status 
employment change  not covered at t-1  
not covered at t 
covered at t-1 
& not covered 
at t 
not covered at 
t-1 & covered 
at t 
covered at t-1 
& covered at t 
Total 
Same job (t & t-1) N 12875 983 1076 15193 30127 
 Row % 42.7 3.3 3.6 50.4 100.0 
 Col. % 75.2 52.8 53.2 80.2 75.4 
Different job within 
same employment (t v. 
t-1) 
N 1350 156 167 2172 3845 
 Row % 35.1 4.1 4.3 56.5 100.0 
 Col. % 7.9 8.4 8.3 11.5    9.6 
Different employment 
(t v. t-1) 
N 2897 723 781 1590 5991 
 Row % 48.4 12.1 13.0 26.5 100.0 
 Col. % 16.9 38.8 38.6 8.4  15.0 
Total N 17122 1862 2024 18955 39963 
 Row % 42.8 4.7 5.1 47.4 100.0 
 Col. % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: Excludes 2.5 % of employee observations where information on employment change was 
missing or inconsistent. 
